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HIGH COURT DECISION ON DUTY OWED BY LICENSEE TO PATRON 
INTRODUCTION 
 In a previous column of Queensland Lawyer,
1
 the case of Scott v CAL No 14 Pty Ltd (No 2) 
(2009) 256 ALR 512 was discussed.  Special leave to appeal against the decision of the Full Court of 
the Supreme Court of Tasmania was granted and on 10 November 2009 the High Court handed down 
its decision. 
 
BRIEF HISTORY  
 The facts of the case were discussed in the previous column, but briefly were that Scott was 
drinking at the Tandara Motor Inn and there was an understanding that he would not drive home, but 
would leave the motorcycle and the keys at the Inn.  Later in the evening Scott changed his mind and 
demanded the return of his keys and the motorcycle.  A short distance from his home, Scott drove off 
the road and was killed.  His blood alcohol content was 0.253. 
Scott‘s wife instituted proceedings against the proprietor of the Inn and the licensee, alleging 
negligence.  At first instance it was held that no duty of care was owed by either defendant, but if a 
duty was owed, it had been breached in the circumstances.
2
 On appeal to the Full Court, the decision 
that no duty of care was owed was reversed by a majority (Evans and Tennent JJ; Crawford CJ in 
dissent). 
 
DECISION OF THE HIGH COURT 
 The High Court acknowledged that ―various duties to take reasonable care‖ were owed to Scott 
by the proprietor of the Inn and the licensee: at [31].  The duty held to be owed by the majority of the 
Full Court was narrow – ―a duty to take reasonable care to prevent Mr Scott from riding the 
motorcycle when so affected by alcohol as to have reduced capacity to ride it safely‖: at [31] referring 
to (2007) 17 Tas R 72 at [53].  The High Court pointed out that the formulation of the duty was 
narrow as it ―selects a particular chain of circumstances leading towards Mr Scott‘s death and 
contends there was a duty to take care to prevent that chain of circumstances from occurring by 
preventing Mr Scott from rising the motorcycle‖: at [37]. 
It was argued before the High Court that even a more restricted version of the duty of care existed, 
that being a duty to take reasonable care as selected by the parties.  In this case the duty would be that 
care was exercised by contacting Scott‘s wife to collect him: at [32].  In support of this duty reference 
was made to the relationship between the parties including Scott‘s vulnerability and the control of the 
proprietor of the Inn and the licensee.  The High Court disagreed with the argument that Scott was 
vulnerable, noting that he was 41 years old, an experienced drinker and ―he was likely to be conscious 
of his own capacity under the influence of drinking‖: at [33]. The court held that the arrangement as 
to the storing of the motorcycle and the keeping of the keys was merely an informal arrangement, the 
goal being that Scott avoid being breathalysed rather than to prevent him being injured or killed: at 
[36].  Such an arrangement gave the licensee no authority over the motorcycle and keys.  Neither did 
it give control over Scott himself, and to recognise the duty of care as stated by the Full Court would 
impair Scott‘s personal freedom.  As Scott was not vulnerable and nor did the informal arrangement 
as to the storing of the motorcycle make him vulnerable, the duty was in conflict with Scott‘s 
autonomy: at [38]. 
The court held that to impose such a duty would cause ‗legal incoherence‖ as it would not be 
compatible with other duties owed by the licensee: at [39] and [42] citing Sullivan v Moody (2001) 
207 CLR 562 at [55] and [42].  Recognising the duty would clash with the licensee‘s duty not to 
commit the torts of assault, battery, false imprisonment and would also cause conflict with the 
licensee‘s duty as sub-bailee of the motorcycle and keys.  The court agreed with the point made by 
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Crawford CJ in the Full Court,
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 that the legislation in respect of licensed premises did not give any 
power to the licensee to prohibit Scott from committing a criminal offence (driving a vehicle under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor): at[41].  Referring to the relevant various provisions of the Liquor 
and Accommodation Act 1990 (Tas), the Road Safety (Alcohol and Drugs) Act 1970 (Tas) and the 
Traffic Act 1925 (Tas), it was held: 
 These provisions leave no room for the suggestion that the law relating to the tort of negligence 
gave the licensee, without regard to the careful statutory safeguards against abuse of police 
power, a power to arrest Mr Scott or control his freedom to use property — the motorcycle and 
its keys — to which he had a right of possession: at [41]. 
 
NO DUTY OF CARE 
The court held unanimously that no duty of care was owed to Scott.  It was stated that in future it was 
desirable to avoid arguments for a duty of care based upon specific facts of the case as was done in 
this case.  Therefore it was stated: 
 that outside exceptional cases, which this case is not, persons in the position of the proprietor and 
the licensee, while bound by important statutory duties in relation to the service of alcohol and 
the conduct of the premises in which it is served, owe no general duty of care at common law to 
customers which requires them to monitor and minimise the service of alcohol or to protect 
customers from the consequences of the alcohol they choose to consume. That conclusion is 
correct because the opposite view would create enormous difficulties, … relating to customer 
autonomy and coherence with legal norms: at [52] (emphasis added) 
The other ―enormous difficulties referred to include: 
 Difficulty for an observer to assess whether someone is intoxicated (at [53]); 
 Personal privacy of patrons would be infringed if questioned by persons serving drinks 
at licensed premises as to their consumption of alcohol ability (at [53]); 
 It is a personal decision and a question of individual responsibility as to how much a 
person drinks (at [54]); and 
 Conflict between legislation requiring intoxicated patrons to be evicted from licensed 
premises and a duty of care in negligence requiring ―the person‘s safety to be 
safeguarded by not permitting the person to drive or to walk along busy roads, and 
hence requires the person to be detained by some means: (at [55]). 
 
NO BREACH OF DUTY 
The High Court also disagreed with the findings as to breach by the Full Court.  To establish breach it 
must be proven that the defendant failed to act reasonably in the circumstances.
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  The Full Court had 
held that there were five breaches of the duty: 
 Failure by the licensee to contact Scott‘s wife; 
 Failure to persuade or delay Scott from riding the motorcycle; 
 Failure to manifest some resistance to return the motorcycle to Scott;  
 Failure to refuse to return the motorcycle to Scott; and 
 Failure of the licensee to drive Scott home. 
 The High Court discussed that to expect the licensee to phone Scott‘s wife which would have 
involved asking Scott for the number was unsound, in light of the aggression he had displayed: at 
[23].   
 The second and third alleged breaches were also rejected by the High Court as both involved 
―non-compliance with Mr Scott‘s desire to exercise his legal rights to possession of the motorcycle‖: 
at [24].  Comparison was made with the attempts by the defendant in Cole v South Tweed Heads 
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Rugby League Football Club Ltd to persuade the plaintiff to wait before leaving the club to regain 
some sobriety.  Evans and Tennent JJ in the Full Court had reasoned that at the time of returning the 
motorcycle the parties were not considering the legal position that to refuse was an infringement of 
rights.
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  The High Court pointed out that this approach is not correct stating: 
 The actual thinking of the person allegedly in breach of a duty of care is not irrelevant, but since 
the issue turns on what a reasonable person in the circumstances in which the person allegedly in 
breach is placed would do, factors other than those which actually occurred to that person can 
also be material: at [25] citing Wyong Shire Council v Shirt. 
It was also noted that ―a duty which required the licensee to deny Mr Scott access to the keys carried 
a risk of exposing him to physical harm‖: at [26].   
 As to the fourth alleged breach, it was simply stated that to refuse to return the motorcycle was to 
commit an illegal act: at [27].  The court held, in relation to the fifth alleged breach, that it was not 
reasonable to expect a licensee to leave the premises to drive Scott home as this would have required 
tame compliance by Scott, of which there was no evidence, and possibly a breach of the licensee‘s 
contractual or statutory duties: at [28]. 
 The licensee had acted reasonably and complied with any duty owing by offering to phone 
Scott‘s wife, the case being analogous with Cole v South Tweed Heads Rugby League Football Club 
Ltd when the defendant offered the plaintiff safe transport home. 
 
NO CAUSATION 
The High Court held that it could not be established upon the balance of probabilities that if the 
licensee had complied with the duty alleged by the Full Court, that Scott would not have been killed.  
Noting that the licensee did not have Scott‘s wife‘s phone number, that there was no evidence Scott 
would have provided it if asked, that had the wife been contacted she would have arrived in time to 
prevent Scott from riding the motorcycle or that he would have meekly submitted to her driving him 
home, causation could not be proven: at [15]-[19]. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the High Court clearly relieves licensees from owing patrons a general duty of care to 
ensure that they are not injured once they have left the licensed premises.  However, in Cole v South 
Tweed Heads Rugby League Football Club Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 469, Gleeson CJ and Callinan J 
raised the possibility of a duty of care being owed by a publican to a patron in ―exceptional‖ cases.6  
Discussions as to what is an ―exceptional‖ case in South Tweed Heads Rugby League Football Club 
Ltd v Cole at [197] and Scott v CAL No 14 Pty Ltd at [37] indicate that the patron would be so 
intoxicated that are not capable of rational judgment and that intoxication is the result of the publican 
knowingly supplying the alcohol on the licensed premises, or patrons known to be intellectually 
impaired, mentally ill and those who become unconscious.  The facts before the High Court in this 
case did not bear any resemblance to such circumstances and therefore could not be considered as an 
―exceptional‖ case, but the court did not disagree that an ―exceptional‖ case may arise: at [44] and 
[52]. 
 From this decision licensees would be advised that to guard against liability, if the facts do not 
fall within the description of ―exceptional‖ cases, an offer to contact someone to pick the patron up 
would be evidence of reasonable care on their part.  If ―exceptional‖ circumstances exist, further steps 
will be required in light of the High Court‘s acknowledgment that there is a possibility of a duty being 
owed in such cases. 
Amanda Stickley 
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